May 24, 2013

Debunking College Football Myths – Myth #4 – 80 plays on offense equals a win

August 9, 2012 by Leave a Comment

I think it was Gus Malzahn that said he had never lost a game in which his offense had run 80 plays from the line of scrimmage. I’m here to tell you that plenty of other coaches have. As a matter of fact, last year excluding overtime games, 99 teams ran 80 or more plays and lost (but not Auburn) topped by Baylor running 105 plays (to 63 for the winning Oklahoma State team) and Texas Tech with the same number against Texas A&M.

Not only does 80 plays not equal a win, but in fact it equals a loss in over 14% of non-overtime games.

Chad Morris (greenvilleonline.com)

With the advent and growth of the spread offense there are more powerful teams that score quickly and efficiently. Oklahoma State and Oregon come to mind immediately.

During the Bowl season the winners averaged less time of possession and less plays than the losers and the winners only had more time of possession in 42.86% of the games and only had more plays 38.24% of the time.

Looking at the big picture of last season, 59.20% of the time the winning team runs more plays – again, less of an advantage than simply being the home team.

Even more illuminating is this fact: For the 2011 season (713 games) winners averaged 70.91 plays while losers averaged 68.60 plays. Winners averaged only 2.31 more plays per game than losers, hardly a huge advantage that ensures a victory.

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The other side of the Morris offense: Big losses and the effect on the defense

January 7, 2012 by Leave a Comment
Chad Morris (greenvilleonline.com)

Not much was funny about the Orange Bowl on Wednesday evening if you are a Clemson fan, but I do find it “funny” (as in funny in a weird way) that a great many of Clemson fans are shocked about a) the big losses and b) the effect on the defense.

Chad Morris (greenvilleonline.com)

When I studied the Malzahn/Morris offense last summer and wrote about it here and here, several things became clear to me.  When the offense works, it’s a thing of beauty and Clemson can beat anyone.  When it doesn’t work – the losses will be big because this offense can leave the defense hanging.  I actually said the days of the close losses for Clemson was over.

Building on that, we told you that 2011 was going to require Tiger fans to think about defense differently.  I called for a defensive paradigm shift.  True enough, I didn’t quite think the shift would go as far as it did in the Orange Bowl, but…I knew it was coming.

Can the defense improve?  Absolutely.  As a matter of fact I would argue that pre-Georgia Tech the defense wasn’t that bad, but quick strikes and more possessions by the Clemson offense led to more possessions by the opponents offense and more points.  Even in the Georgia Tech game the Tigers fumbled the ball away at their own 9.  Against N.C. State they repeatedly gave the ball to N.C. State in Clemson territory.  Those things are going to happen with this offense from time to time.  It’s why Texas Tech gave up points by the boat load when Leach was there.  It’s why Auburn gave up points in bunches in 2011.  It’s why Tulsa won ”shootouts” with Morris as the offensive coordinator.

In an upcoming post we’ll put this theory to the test and attempt to quantify the real differences between the 2010 and 2011 Clemson defenses in per possession terms.

In a perfect world the defense would be just as good as the offense, but that’s not going to happen with this style of offense.  Even when playing their best the defense will be out there for too many plays, for too long, on too many possessions to be the Clemson defense of old.

So pick your poison Clemson fans.  The Morris offense or a “Vic Koenning-like” defense.

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Successful vs. Non-Sucessful Plays Part I

December 12, 2011 by Leave a Comment

One of the criticisms of the yard per carry stat is that it skews the argument in the favor of a player who has one (or a few) big carry.  One example of this can be found in the statistics of Andre Ellington and Mike Bellamy in 2011.  When I suggested that Bellamy was a break away threat that the Tigers needed the argument was made that Bellamy’s statistics were padded by “one long run”.  There are several reasons why I don’t believe this is true, but I’ll focus on a few here to make my point.

It is true that Bellamy had a 75 yard touchdown on his first carry of the season (and his college career) against Troy and finished the first 13 games with 343 yards on 57 carries for a 6.0 yard per carry average.  This means that 22% of his yards gained came on one carry.

On the other hand Andre Ellington gained 1,062 yards on 213 carries for a 5.0 yard per carry average.  Ellington had a 74 yard touchdown run during the season.

If you subtract Bellamy’s 75 yard touchdown run from his statistics and Ellington’s 74 yarder from his, Bellamy still averaged 4.8 yards on his other 56 carries, while Ellington averaged 4.7 on his other 212 carries.  This means that it was more than”one long run” that led to Bellamy’s higher yard per carry statistic.  This doesn’t even take into account the inherent problems associated with discounting ”carries that don’t fit your argument”.  If you pick and choose which carries you are going to count, your analysis is obviously going to be biased and skewed in favor of your preferred outcome.

Shortly after this discussion I read a post by Chase Stuart on SmartFootball.com that analyzed running backs in the NFL by classifying each rushing attempt as “successful” or “not successful”.  I was intrigued by this concept and decided to apply it to the Clemson running backs in order to provide more context for the Clemson running game.

I also expanded this concept to the passing game, using similar guidelines.  You might think (as I did) that the completion percentage would correlate closely to the ratio of successful pass plays.  I foun this to not necessarily be true as we’ll see in future posts.

Here is the criteria for a successful rushing play:

  1. All carries count, except as noted in # 2 below.
  2. All instances of 3rd or 4th down carries where the player needed to gain more than 5 yards for a first down have been removed. As Stuart points out in his post it doesn’t feel right blaming the runner for not gaining 7 yards on 3rd and 7, so simply eliminate all of these failures from the data. However, on the rare occasions where a running back did convert for the first down, those plays were not removed. This does not happen often (only happened 14 times this season).
  3. For all 3rd or 4th downs, a success is defined as gaining the first down (and/or touchdown). A failure is every rush that does not gain a first down.
  4. On all downs, a first down (which includes a touchdown) is a success.
  5. On all second downs, a success is achieved when the player gains at least 50% of the yards needed for the first down. This means that 2nd-and-10 runs are failures unless they pick up 5 yards; on 2nd-and-7, the running back must gain at least 4 yards. A rush for one yard on and-and-3 is a failure, and so on.
  6. On first down, a running back is credited with a successful play if he gains at least 40% of the yards needed; therefore, four yards are required on 1st-and-10 before the running back is given credit. On 1st and goal from the 5, a two-yard gain would be considered a success.

Here is the criteria for successful passing plays:

    1. All pass attempts count.
    2. Sacks are counted as unsuccessful pass plays.
    3. For all 3rd or 4th downs, a success is defined as gaining the first down (and/or touchdown). A failure is every pass that does not gain a first down, whether completed or not.
    4. On all downs, a first down (which includes a touchdown) is a success.
    5. On all second downs, a success is achieved when the play gains at least 50% of the yards needed for the first down. This means that 2nd-and-10 passes are failures unless they pick up 5 yards; on 2nd-and-7, the pass must gain at least 4 yards. A pass for one yard on and-and-3 is a failure, and so on.
    6. On first down, a successful play is credited if it gains at least 40% of the yards needed; therefore, four yards are required on 1st-and-10 before the pass is successful. On 1st and goal from the 5, a two-yard gain would be considered a success.

Here is what the big picture looked like for Clemson through the first 13 games:

Successful % Successful Non-Successful % Non-Successful N/A N/A%
Rushing 241 50.95 218 46.09 14 2.96
Passing 240 47.24 268 52.76 - -
Total 481 49.03 486 49.54 14 1.43

It’s interesting to me that while there were multiple failures of the running game in individual games this year, as a whole there was a higher percentage of successful plays on the ground vs. through the air. We often point to the running game as a problem, but the passing game was a massive failure against South Carolina and not very good against Georgia Tech, N.C. State and even in the first game against Virginia Tech in a win.

We’ve given each Clemson play a “Yes” or “No” (with a few N/As as noted above) in our Clemson play-by-play database in the “Success” column on the far right.

In upcoming posts we’ll drill down to individual running backs, receivers and quarterbacks to see how they performed in this “pass/fail” analysis.

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The Hurry-Up, No-Huddle: An Offensive Philosophy (Part 2)

August 4, 2011 by Leave a Comment
Chad Morris

Last week we took a look at the history, goals and advantages of the Hurry-Up, No-Huddle Offense designed by Gus Malzahn.  In this post, we’ll look at the details and nuances of the offense, tips for running the offense successfully and provide some insight into what Clemson fans should look for to determine if the offense is working as intended.

Chad Morris

An important note is that the ideas expressed here are broad, general concepts derived from the Malzahn version of the offense and may differ from the Morris iteration that Clemson will implement.

Attention to detail and repetition are the key building blocks to make the offense successful.  The following tips are important factors in achieving success and reaching goals in the offense:

  1. Limit the number of plays and formations that are implemented initially.  We saw this in the spring as Morris talked in general terms of implementing a fraction of his offense with an eye towards building on this foundation in fall camp.  This is important for several reasons:  You don’t want to overwhelm your team and you want them to experience success early and breed confidence.
  2. Limit the number of players that participate.  Remember, this is about speed and snapping the ball within seconds of being marked ready for play.  Mass substitutions typically take time and can become an issue as the quarterback should be calling the next play as the team returns to the line of scrimmage.
  3. Changes in the snap count should be limited.  The idea is that your team should be given as little as possible to think about and this fosters your offensive team getting into a rhythm of moving quickly and efficiently.  While it is not important that the defense may quickly discern your snap count it is advisable to change your snap count periodically to keep the defense honest (and perhaps get a offside penalty).
  4. The chain gang is very important.  At your home stadium they need to understand the speed at which your offense will move.  It’s important they keep up.  On the road you face a much more difficult task and should address this prior to the game with the referees (see #5 below) prior to the game.  A slow chain crew can be devastating to the hurry-up, no-huddle offense.
  5. There should be a discussion with the officials prior to each game about what they can expect from your offense and get a clear understanding of how and when the ball will be readied for play.  I can picture one of Ron Cherry’s minions standing over the ball now, slowing the play to a crawl.  When you begin to experience success the opposing coach is going to object to the pace.  The game should not be speeded up, but it also should not be slowed down because of your success.
  6. Players should be trained to hand the ball to the referee, or preferably, the umpire (who spots the ball).  Retrieving dropped balls takes time and slows down the offense.  In addition, receivers should not retrieve incomplete passes, they should head back to the line of scrimmage and get the next play.
  7. Motion should be limited where possible in order to foster snapping the ball within the goal of being snapped within 5 seconds from when marked ready for play.
  8. Practice should actually occur at a faster pace than the games so that the games seem “slow” to players and allows the players to perform at a high level.

The first 7 items are things that Clemson fans should be able to judge on game day and should directly tie to the successful implementation of the “Smash Mouth Spread”.  Though not many of us have the ability to compare practice and game speed (#8), it’s a sure bet that if the offense is reaching its goals this is also being accomplished.

 

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The Hurry-Up, No-Huddle: An Offensive Philosophy (Part 1)

July 27, 2011 by Leave a Comment

What can Clemson fans expect from Chad Morris’ offense when September 3 rolls around?  80 plays, 500 yards and 45 points a game?  Who really knows?  We saw what Auburn did, but they had Cam Newton.  We saw what Tulsa did, but they play in C-USA.  And what is the Hurry-Up, No-Huddle anyway, what are the secrets to being successful with it, goals of the offense and measuring sticks for success or failure?

To get some of these questions answered my summer reading project (one of them anyway) was “The Hurry-Up, No-Huddle: An Offensive Philosophy” by Gus Malzahn.  The Morris version is not exactly the same as each coach adds an iteration or two as shown by Morris preferring the term “Smash Mouth Spread”, which seems to rely on more of a running game than the Malzahn version (at least the Malzahn high school version).  Still, looking at the birth and development of the base system (and goals) will be beneficial in understanding what Morris will attempt to do with the Clemson offense.

In this series we’ll look at the history, set the background, define the goals and see how these and other facets of the offense may (or may not) apply to the 2011 Clemson Tigers.

In the Beginning

After a 6-6 record in 1996 Malzahn realized that he needed an edge if his team was going to compete for a state championship.  Shiloh Christian was from an area of Arkansas not known for a wealth of talent and while researching philosophies the coaches noticed that they often scripted two or three plays in the hurry up mode at the beginning of games and these plays were typically successful.  However, after these initial hurry-up plays they regressed to their regular offense and their usual struggles.  What if we ran the hurry-up the entire game?  Viola!  A revolution was begun.

The new offense took a 6-6 team that averaged 15.5 points, 252 yards and 41 plays into a team that was 14-1, averaged 30 points per game, 448 yards, and 59 plays per game in high school.  After year 4 of the Hurry-Up, No-Huddle, Malzahn’s teams had combined for a 57-2-1 record and averaged 6,816 yards of offense per year (454 yards per game – in HIGH SCHOOL).

What it is and what it is not

The Malzahn offense is a true hurry-up offense in the sense it is not a no huddle, get to the line of scrimmage and look to the sideline for the play as in some previous versions of the Clemson offense.  As we’ll see shortly, the goal is to get the snap off as quickly as possible, not get to the line, look to the sideline, call the play and THEN snap the ball.

Goals

The Malzahn Hurry-Up, No-Huddle has specific goals during the game.

  1. Speed up the game – The quarterback should be calling out the next play as the players are returning to the line of scrimmage.  The ball should be snapped within 5 seconds of being marked ready for play, perhaps a couple of seconds longer if motion is a big part of the offense.  The quicker the ball is snapped the larger advantage gained by the offense.  The offensive team wants to control the tempo of the game.
  2. Lengthen the game – Not the time the game takes to play (the 2 and a half to 3 hours), but the actual playing time, i.e. you want more plays to be run.  This philosophy also requires a team to be aggressive in all areas – offense, defense and special teams.  You want your team to have as many offensive opportunities as possible, so giving up long, time-consuming drives by playing a “safe” defense is counterproductive.  Many times Malzahn would go for it on fourth down in his own territory, unconcerned that he may give up an “easy score”.  An interesting side note is that this philosophy sometimes leads to a “when you lose, you lose big” result.  Think Texas Tech under Mike Leach (a different offense I know, but he often went for it on fourth down and lost big when he lost).  Many times Malzahn used his quarterback as the punter from the shotgun to avoid having a team being able to set up a return.  You have to be willing to gamble and live (or die) with the results.  Morris, of course, won’t be making the decisions on when to go for it on fourth down so I would expect that what we see will be more typical of the college coaches decision-making on 4th down – in other words don’t expect Dabo to go for it on 4th and 5 from his own 27 in the first quarter.
  3. Mentally and physically wear down your opponent – Constant pressure on your opponent is the goal, not only their defense, but their offense, too.  Your defense should pressure their offense and take chances.  If you achieve goals one and two above this usually takes care of itself.

Advantages of the offense

The book was written for high school coaches and as such there are some passages that do not apply to college football, but here are the ones that do:

  1. You will set the tempo of the game – Think “Basketball on grass”.
  2. It’s fun for players and fans – We’ve seen the quotes, the players love it.  We’ve heard the fans, they want it.
  3. Score points quickly – Makes it easier to get opposing teams out of their game plans early.
  4. More offensive snaps – Malzahn thinks this is significant and that’s hard to argue given the stats we provided above.  However, my research on college football indicates the number of snaps is less important than other factors in winning games.
  5. Defenses cannot simulate it in practice - Think Georgia Tech.
  6. Defenses have to spend more time than usual preparing - Think Clemson preparing for Georgia Tech
  7. Stops defenses from regrouping after big plays – We saw an example of this in the spring game, a long pass, followed by a quick hitter, followed by a short touchdown run, all within a minute or so.  Defenses will have to use a timeout to regroup.
  8. Pressure is on the opposing defensive coordinator and communication problems – How is a defensive play usually called?  DC looks at the down and distance and offensive tendencies, makes a call, relays it to the sideline, the sideline signals it in.  That’s impossible in 5 to 8 seconds.  Maybe 10 players get the call right and one is out of position.  If this happens 8 or 10 or 12 times a game its a huge advantage.
  9. Fatigue for defenses – No more 25 second ( or more) breaks between plays for the defense.  A 25 yard run could be followed by a long pass 5 to 8 seconds after the ball is marked ready to play.

Now that you have an understanding of the origins, goals and advantages of the hurry-up, no-huddle offense we’ll continue to delve into the nuances of the offense next week in part 2.

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